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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7308  
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RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001132

SIPDIS  
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STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG  
OSD FOR KIMMITT  
ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR  
STATE FOR INL/AP, INL/FO, AND INR  
CIA FOR CNC

EO 12958 DECL: 04/04/2017  
TAGS SNAR, KCRM, AF  
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS' MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO  
AFGHANISTAN  
REF: KABUL 1014

Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) SUMMARY: Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy John Walters visited Afghanistan March 17-20 to discuss with senior Afghan and i

KARZAI NEEDS TO TAKE ACTION  
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2. (C/NOFORN) ONDCP Director Walters met with COM ISAF General McNeill in Kabul, and separately with RC South Commander Major General Van Loo

3. (C/NOFORN) McNeill thought the missing ingredient in the counter-narcotics effort was Karzai. Despite some public statements, he had failed

HIGH VALUE TARGETS  
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4. (C) To Walters' question on going after high value targets, McNeill said it was necessary to prosecute a few to keep faith with the general  
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VAN LOON AGREEMENT ON TIMING, NEED FOR ASSISTANCE  
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5. (C) In a meeting the next day in Kandahar, RC South commander Major General Van Loon, who was accompanied for part of the meeting by Kandah  
GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION AND PROBLEMS OF

CORRUPTION  
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6. (C) Following Asadullah's departure, Van Loon agreed that the Governor was making progress on eradication, but he took issue with his targe

7. (C/NF) Van Loon was somewhat defensive in discussing the failure of Uruzgan Governor Monib to take any action on eradication. He argued the

8. (C) RC South has begun developing information on ties between traffickers, insurgents, and government officials. They recognize that going

VISIT TO HELMAND  
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9. (C) On March 20 Director Walters visited the INL-funded Afghan Eradication Force's (AEF) forward operating base in Helmand. During the visi  
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agricultural options and has the potential to become Afghanistan's "bread basket." All farmers, he said, know that growing poppy is illegal, an

GOA MINISTERS - MORE ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT  
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10. (C) Walters met over dinner with a number of Afghan officials, including the Ministers of Interior, Agriculture, Counter-narcotics, and Ec

11. (C) Two themes emerged. First, there should be much more active involvement by local government in decision-making on what kind of assiste

COMMENT  
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12. (C) Director Walters' meetings with GOA and international community officials highlighted the complexity of Afghanistan's poppy dilemma. I

13. (C) In the background, the poppy continues to grow, and Walters' aerial surveillance of rich poppy fields in Helmand offered immediate and

14. (U) Director Walters's party cleared this cable.

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